The abundance of transaction data available on the Internet tends to make information more transparent in electronic marketplaces. In such a transparent environment, it becomes easier for suppliers to obtain information that may allow them to infer their rivals' costs. Is this good news or bad news? In this study, we focus on the informational effects of business-to-business (B-to-B) exchanges, and explore firms' incentives to join a B-to-B exchange that provides an online platform for information transmission. We then study the equilibria by developing a gametheoretic model under asymmetric information. We examine whether the incentives to join a Bto-B exchange would be different under different competition modes (quantity and price), different information structures, and by varying the nature of the products (substitutes and complements). Our results challenge the "information transparency hypothesis" (i.e., open sharing of information in electronic markets is beneficial to all participating firms). In contrast to the popular belief, we show that information transparency could be a double-edged sword. The individual rationality of participation in the online exchange reflects the tradeoff between information transparency and data confidentiality. This may have important implications for the microstructure design (e.g., data access rules) of B-to-B electronic marketplaces.
Introduction
Despite the controversies surrounding business-to-business (B-to-B) online exchanges, the Internet-based digital marketplaces are considered to have the potential to reduce transaction costs, add product and pricing transparency, generate market liquidity, and facilitate bidding by a broad spectrum of potential suppliers in a standardized platform (Zhu 2002) . 1 In particular, online B-to-B exchanges allegedly streamline information flow in supply chains (Lee and Whang 2000) . The re-balance of information asymmetry is an important motivation for establishing Bto-B exchanges (McKinsey Quarterly 2001 ). Yet, given these multiple benefits, why is it that Bto-B exchanges have not been widely adopted? Why are suppliers still reluctant to join a highprofile exchange such as Covisint? B-to-B exchanges indeed seem to improve information transparency, but is information transparency a benefit or a threat?
Information technology (IT) has in general improved the flow of information (Kemerer 1998) . Bto-B electronic exchanges in particular provide an online platform in which information is gathered, compiled, displayed, and transmitted among participating companies. In this sense, online B-to-B exchanges play a role of transmitting or aggregating information within a particular industry (Zhu 2002) . Examples include Covisint in the automobile industry, e-Steel and MetalSite in the metal industry, FreeMarkets in the high-tech industry, and Exostar in the aerospace industry. In addition to public exchanges, Internet-based private exchanges have been created by many large corporations by establishing online links with their suppliers and business partners. Examples include Wal-Mart, Cisco, Dell, and Hewlett-Packard.
The proliferation of these Internet-based marketplaces creates a vast sea of information about products, prices, transactions, and competitors. Today a huge flow of information is being exchanged between buyers and sellers, between suppliers and manufacturers, and among competitors. This makes information more transparent in electronic markets than in traditional physical markets. Information transparency is defined as the degree of visibility and accessibility of information (Zhu 2002) . The subject of information in the context of electronic markets has gained the interest of both academics and practitioners. Bakos (1998) describes the three main functions of markets: matching buyers and sellers; facilitating the exchange of information; and providing an institutional infrastructure. In this study, we focus on the second role, as the digitization of information combined with the rise of high-speed networks has heightened the role of information in electronic markets. Data are real time, more transparent, and more synchronized; information flows more instantaneously in electronic markets (Grover et al 1999) .
In this regard, information transparency becomes one of the key features that distinguish digital exchanges from traditional markets (Zhu 2003) .
The Internet increases information transparency in several ways. The Internet in general not only contains abundant information but also reduces the search cost for that information (Bakos 1997) . 2 More specifically, using reverse-auction bidding, XML mapping, data mining, and intelligent agent technologies, online exchanges allow participants to see the "price floor" more easily than they can with traditional markets in which inferring costs has been cumbersome (Sinha 2000) . 3 It is often the case that data regarding prices, quantities, and bidding specifications are recorded in a database and made available to participants of the exchanges. For example, on FreeMarkets' reverse auction platform, suppliers do not have to guess at their competitors' bids as they traditionally do with opaque request-for-quotes (RFQs). They see exactly what the competition is bidding, in real time, and how low they must go to pocket the deal (Tully 2000) . Sooner or later, competitors will come to know the price floor -the lowest price for which a company is willing to sell a product or service, which is typically a good proxy for the firm's marginal cost. There are many such real-world examples illustrating that information is more transparent on electronic exchanges than in traditional markets.
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2 The efficiencies of Internet-based searches are especially clear in the context of industrial procurement. In the past, a manufacturer's options were fairly limited. An auto manufacturer that needed steel, for example, either had to rely on its well-worn list of suppliers or hope to hear of new vendors by word of mouth. But B-to-B exchanges such as eSteel and MetalSite allow a wide range of companies to find one another. The automaker thus may find 10 suppliers for the type of steel it needs. It can use that information to get a much better sense of what the costs of the steel really are. 3 Internet searches will become increasingly sophisticated with the spread of the extensible markup language (XML). XML protocol is replacing the Web's traditional HTML for B-to-B procurement. XML makes it possible to describe products, features, and prices with far greater precision. It lets B-to-B exchanges set more detailed matching criteria, which gives buyers and sellers immediate access to even richer stores of information. Likewise, other technologies such as data mining and intelligent agents are becoming increasingly capable of helping companies make inferences about rivals' costs when past trading patterns are known. 4 Cost transparency is increasing on all sorts of electronic markets. On Covisint, suppliers can see who is selling brakes and clutches, at what prices, and in what quantities. As posted on its website, "Covisint allows you to quickly share critical information… and to browse, as well as receive and transmit electronic information." On eBay, data about bidding prices, quantity, winning bids, and seller identity are all visible on its auction website, which started
In this paper, we leave out the details of the process of price discovery and information transmission. Instead, we focus on the equilibrium effects of such information transmission.
Transparent information is typically regarded as a good thing due to possible efficiencies arising from more widespread dissemination of accurate information. Yet, "suppliers are finding that, in a transparent environment where competitors can see each other's bids, the price for goods is being driven down" (Wilson 2000) . That there are risks, as well as potential gains, associated with online marketplaces is reflected in the comment: "To have a full collaborative environment is a hard sell for me … what I am going to lose in terms of visibility and exposing my information to potential competitors is greater than what I would gain on the collaboration side" (Meehan 2001) . Hence, cost transparency in B-to-B exchanges remains a real concern. 5 "For suppliers, the two biggest detractions for exchanges right now are transparency--the fact that every competitor can see what every other competitor is bidding--and lack of liquidity, which means there aren't enough buyers to really generate much bidding" (Wilson 2000) .
These issues give rise to a set of critical research questions regarding the informational role of online B-to-B marketplaces. Research questions of particular interest include:
• What incentives will firms have to join the B-to-B exchange?
• How will these incentives be moderated by cost structures, uncertainty of information, and the nature of competition (price vs. quantity)?
• Will firms that expose private cost data to the B-to-B exchange be able to jointly optimize their output or price decisions to increase their profitability? Or, will they find that such exposure allows competitors to undermine efforts to optimize their production decisions?
Intuitively, information aggregation tends to have two types of effects: the direct effect on the firm and the cross effect on its rivals (Zhu 2003) . First, receiving more accurate information permits the firms to choose the strategies that are more finely tuned to the actual state of the as a business-to-consumer market but also conducts business-to-business transactions as small-and medium-sized companies turn to eBay for procurement. As yet another example from our daily life, detailed breakdowns of invoice prices of new cars are now readily available on the Internet; car dealers are no longer able to hide their cost data. 5 Exchange of cost information was part of the concern in the Covisint investigation conducted by the Federal Trade Commission. Despite the fact that the FTC gave approval to the auto exchange, concerns remain about the consequences of exchanging private cost information among rivals. Orbitz is another online marketplace that was subject to anti-competitive scrutiny.
market, and hence improve the profits, so the increased transparency of information for a firm has a positive effect. On the other hand, transparent information may affect the degree of correlation among the strategies of all other firms. The increased strategy correlation and the increased precision of the rivals have a rather subtle, complicated effect on the behavior of the firms. The equilibrium behavior is not clear without a rigorous model.
Seeking to better understand these issues, we built a simple game-theoretic model, with some abstractions and assumptions, so that we can begin to study the informational effects of B-to-B marketplaces. We utilized the concept of Fulfilled Rational Expectations Equilibrium with incomplete information. 6 One implication of this equilibrium concept is that the market participants incorporate the information that is contained in the equilibrium price in their decision making process. This reflects the aggregation and transparency of information in a market mechanism with very little friction, such as an Internet-based B-to-B exchange.
Our model shows that firms' incentives to join a B-to-B exchange are sensitive to their relative cost positions, the nature of the products, and the competition mode. Firms with heterogeneous costs have different incentives for information exchange. We also find that information transparency benefits some firms but hurts others. For substitute products, profits and market share will be redistributed from high-cost firms to low-cost firms. Under the assumptions of our model, when uncertainty of information rises, firms would have stronger incentives to participate in the B-to-B exchange, and the membership size of the exchange would increase.
Relationship to other studies: Due to the recent emergence of B-to-B exchange as a recognizable economic phenomenon, prior research aimed directly at the questions posed here has been limited. Some more general theory, however, has been developed in the context of interorganizational systems, especially electronic data interchange (EDI), in the IS literature.
Several papers have studied the effects of EDI on buyers and sellers, with issues arising from the intersection of information technology and industrial organization (see, among others, Barua and Lee 1997; Riggins et al 1994; Wang and Seidmann 1995; Zhu 1999) . These studies significantly improved our understanding about strategic behavior in the EDI context. B-to-B exchanges have some features in common with EDI, but they also exhibit significant differences. In particular, data disclosure and information transparency was less a concern in the proprietary EDI context than in the Internet-based B-to-B setting. Typically, EDI does not provide market transparency as it is often conducted over proprietary value-added networks and controlled by one large buyer.
We build on these studies, particularly the game-theoretic modeling of interorganizational systems, and address additional concerns related to the informational effects arising in the emerging B-to-B exchange context.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the basic setup of the model.
Section 3 analyzes firms' incentives to join a B-to-B exchange under quantity competition.
Section 4 extends the model to the setting of price competition. Section 5 concludes the paper.
We emphasize the results in the text and relegate the technical proofs to the appendices. For readers' convenience, a list of notations is summarized at the end of the paper.
The Model
We consider a market in which there are a finite number of n suppliers ( 2 n ≥ ), and each firm's technology is subject to uncertainty. They can trade through either traditional bilateral contracting or a new B-to-B online exchange. The B-to-B exchange makes certain transaction data visible on its website. For simplicity, we ignore the cost of joining the B-to-B exchange.
The sequence of events occurs as follows: (1) firms decide whether or not to join the B-to-B exchange with an understanding that the B-to-B exchange will make signals regarding its cost data visible to other exchange members; (2) with its own cost data endowed initially, each firm may access additional information about other firms' costs on the B-to-B exchange, depending on its decision from stage (1); and (3) each firm chooses its output or price level, conditional on its information set from stage (2). This three-stage timing structure is illustrated in Figure 1 .
Notice that firms do not announce their participation decisions until the game is over (i.e., here we model a one-shot simultaneous game).
We use a simple linear demand function to represent the buying side: 7 7 Linear demand and Cournot behavior create a linear/quadratic payoff structure that is a second-order approximation to more general problems (Zhu 1999) . In particular, the linear demand results tend to be a good
where p is the price, i q is the quantity, and d is the demand intercept with slope normalized to 1.
We assume there is a continuum of buyers in the market so that their individual decisions do not influence the market outcome. This allows us to focus on the strategic interactions of the suppliers.
The technology is stochastic and exhibits constant returns to scale. In other words, each firm employs a technology with a marginal cost, denoted by i c for firm i:
That is, each firm's marginal cost i c is a random variable. The cost vector 
where ρ is the correlation coefficient between any pair ( , ), approximation to more general demand functions (Shapiro 1986) . The linearity assumption is also used in all of the related papers referenced here. In addition, we assume that d is large enough to ensure positive price; capacity is not a concern; and firms are risk neutral. 8 Normal distributions have several useful properties. First, it is a close approximation to marginal costs in realworld industries. Second, from a modeling perspective, any marginal or conditional distributions of a joint normal For multivariate normal distribution, the conditional expectations obey a linear property, namely, the Linear Conditional Expectation (LCE) property.
Lemma 1 (LCE property):
The conditional expectation of j c given i c is:
E c c c
Further, given the cost information, 1
Proof: see Appendix O.
Notice that for 1 k = , conditional expectation (4) reduces to (3). The LCE property means that, for a multivariate normal distribution, its regression equations (conditional means) are linear functions of the conditioning variables. The parameters of the regression functions are determined by the covariance structure (i.e., ρ ). Given their information sets upon joining the B2B exchange, firms will update their conditional belief about other firms' cost, and the conditional expectations obey a linear function. That is, (
can be used to update posterior expectations on j c via the mechanism specified by (3) and (4). 9 distribution are still normal (Tong 1990, p.30-35) . Also, any linear combinations or transformations of normally distributed random variables are also normally distributed (DeGroot and Schervish 2002, p.272) . 9 In addition to normal distributions, the LCE property is also valid for other types of distributions, such as GammaPoisson and Beta-Bernoulli, among others (Malueg and Tsutsui 1998) . Hence, results based on the LCE property might be generalizable to other distributions beyond the normal distribution.
We focus on the informational consequences of joining the B-to-B exchange. After firm i joins the exchange, its trading activities will be recorded in the exchange database, which may reveal its cost, i c , to other member firms belonging to the exchange. In return, it can observe the costs of other firms that are also trading on the exchange. The set (1, 2,..., ) N n = of all n firms is partitioned into two subsets, the set K of k K = firms that join the B-to-B exchange and its complement set \ N K of (n-k) firms that trade outside of the B-to-B exchange (e.g., through
traditional bilateral negotiation and contracting). This is shown in Figure 2 . Hence, the essential difference between the two sets of firms is their distinct information structures.
By this construction, the set of firms in K obtains information from their participation in the Bto-B exchange to which no firm in \ N K belongs. Their information set is
where i I denotes the information set available to firm i. Joining the B-to-B exchange revises firm
outside of the B-to-B exchange, each firm's information set is confined to its own cost. That is,
To sum up this section, we have made the following assumptions:
• A1: Demand and cost functions are represented by (1) and (2);
• A2: Firms use (3) and (4) to update their conditional belief about rivals' costs;
• A3: The B-to-B exchange facilitates information transparency in the sense that observed transaction data are perfectly correlated with costs (i.e., no noise in the signals). 
The transmission of information can only be done through the B-to-B exchange.
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In the following two sections, we will develop the model and examine whether the incentives to join a B-to-B exchange would be different under different information structures and two types of competition (quantity and price). We will show the results under quantity competition first in §3, as its results are more intuitive and the notions of direct effect and cross effect can be illustrated more easily. We then consider price competition in §4 and show how the incentives to join the B-to-B exchange might change.
Incentives to Join a B-to-B Exchange under Quantity Competition
Given the above assumptions and the model setup, we proceed to derive the equilibrium quantities and profits under two information structures. Firms maximize their expected profits by choosing output levels non-cooperatively for the given information structure, assuming that all other firms behave the same; namely, they play a Cournot game. Following the standard gametheoretic approach, the equilibrium notion we use is that of a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, which requires that each firm's strategy be a best response to its conjectures about the behavior of the rivals. By backward induction, we first examine the last stage (optimal quantities), and then work backward to analyze the first stage (whether to join the B-to-B exchange).
Optimal Quantities
We derive the optimal strategies corresponding to two different information sets in (5) and (6) associated with B-to-B exchange members and non-members, respectively. A member firm i maximizes its expected profit, conditional on its information set
Solving this optimization problem yields the following optimal quantity:
where is the equilibrium quantity in the absence of cost uncertainty (i.e., if output
were all produced at a constant cost, µ ). Sensitivity coefficient φ represents a "direct" adjustment to the firm's own cost, and ψ represents a "counter" adjustment to rivals' costs.
Sensitivity ψ also depends on non-members' behavior, β , which is yet to be determined. This means that the "direct" and "counter" adjustments by the member firms involve the behavior of the non-members. 11 Examining the equilibrium quantities in (8) As proved by Basar and Ho (1974) and Basar (1978) , affine strategies linear in the signal constitute a Nash equilibrium when objective functions are quadratic in the decision variable (our profit functions are quadratic in q). In equilibrium, given the normality assumption and the linear conditional expectation property, firms' output strategies are a linear function of their costs (Basar and Ho 1974; Basar 1978) . Consistent with Shapiro (1986) and Li (1985) , we suppose that non-member's quantity is expected to be a linear function of its cost, in the affine form , where α and β are constants. It must be true 0 β > , because higher cost means lower quantity. As shown in Appendix A, this turns out to be precisely the optimal quantity in equilibrium (see (12) below), which is consistent with the notion of fulfilled rational expectations equilibrium.
11 The members and non-members make their decisions simultaneously and interdependently -members' decisions depend on their conjectures about non-members' strategies, and vice versa. That is why the coefficients of Now, consider the profit-optimization problem of a non-member firm,
. Not having access to the information aggregated on the B-to-B exchange, each firm's information set is confined to its own private cost data, j c , at the time when it makes its output decisions. Firm j maximizes its expected profit, conditional on its information set,
Solving this maximization problem in Appendix A yields:
where 2 2 (1
The coefficients φ , ψ , and β represent the behavior of the member and non-member firms.
Investigating (9), (10), and (13) reveals the following property:
Lemma 3: Sensitivity coefficients ψ and β are positive and less than 1.
Equilibrium Profits
In order to analyze the formation of the B-to-B exchange, it is necessary to derive and compare the equilibrium profits for members (12), into the profit functions in (7) and (11), and using the conditional expectations (3) and (4), we derive the following result:
Proposition 1 (equilibrium profits):
In equilibrium, for B-to-B exchange members, expected profit will be
For non-members, expected profit will be
Proof: see Appendix A. serves as an information-transmission platform.
Cost Heterogeneity, Separating Equilibrium, and Differential Incentives
Having derived the optimal outputs and equilibrium profits, we are now prepared to determine whether the firms in the exchange can expect to make higher profits than the non-members. Each firm considers information exchange beneficial in the classical Pareto-dominance sense when
, for any given exchange size, k, i K ∈ and
To compare the expected profit of joining the exchange versus staying offline, we need to quantify the expected profit difference,
, from Proposition 1, as
Defining i c c µ ∆ ≡ − , and plugging the expectations of (8) and (12), π ∆ can be written as a quadratic function of c ∆ :
By examining its first and second derivatives, we found that π ∆ is a convex, U-shaped curve. As shown in Appendix B, solving the equation Proof: see Appendix A.
The basic tradeoff that drives the incentives for a firm to trade on the B-to-B exchange is the increased precision of information, decomposed in the effect on the firm itself and on its rivals, and the correlation induced in the strategies of the firms. By making cost data more transparent and by "advertising" their relatively aggressive reaction curves, the low-cost firms induce the rivals to shrink their outputs. This leads to a more efficient allocation of output (and market share) than would arise in the absence of information transparency. Without the transparent information facilitated by the B-to-B exchange, all firms would estimate their rivals' costs based on their limited private information, which tends to make their estimates around the mean of the cost, µ . With the B-to-B exchange, the fog clears out and the firms can see through each other's costs better than before. In the new information-transparent equilibrium, more efficient firms produce more. Hence, the mix of output (and market share) is shifted from high-cost firms to low-cost firms. This would result in very different incentives toward information transparency on the B-to-B exchange: in equilibrium we will find that low-cost firms will prefer to trade on the transparent online exchange, while high-cost firms will have incentives to trade in an opaque environment where they can hide their "uncompetitive" costs.
With the result in Proposition 2, we can now make the notion of "low-cost" and "high-cost" more precise. Low-cost firms are those firms whose costs are below the critical level, i.e., î c c < .
High-cost firms are those whose costs are above the critical level, i.e., 
Corollary 2 (separating equilibrium): In equilibrium, those firms trading through the B-to-B exchange are expected to be the more efficient (with lower costs or better technology) firms, while those less efficient (higher cost) firms continue to trade through the traditional markets such as bilateral contracts or negotiation.
Given the separating-equilibrium nature induced by information transparency, the mere existence of the online exchange makes it more difficult for high-cost firms to hide their cost data. Besides information revealed from online transactions data, the action to join or not to join the B-to-B exchange itself may single out the high-cost firms. For example, if firm j chooses to stay away from the B-to-B exchange, then other firms could infer that firm j is likely to be a high-cost firm (although they still do not know firm j's exact cost). Therefore, we have the following result: σ ↑ , then ĉ ↑ , so more firms will find it profitable to join the exchange. Consequently, the exchange's membership size and critical mass will increase. Hence, uncertainty works to the advantage of the B-to-B exchange and its members.
Comparison with the literature:
To close this section, it is worth noting the differences between our results and the literature. The closest studies to our model might be Shapiro (1986) and Li (1985) . They studied two extreme information-sharing scenarios: either industrywide complete information pooling or no information sharing at all. They found that all firms in the industry always preferred perfect revelation of their private information to rivals. These all-or-none options for information sharing can be considered as two special cases of our model, corresponding to k n = and 1 k = , respectively. Further, our model shows a very different result, namely, not all the firms in the industry would prefer to join the exchange. As shown above, firms with heterogeneous costs have different incentives for information exchange. Uncertainty of information also plays a role in the participation. Generally speaking, it would not be the case that all firms join the exchange.
This result is a significant extension to the literature. Finally, price competition was not considered in Shapiro (1986) and Li (1985) .
Price Competition
We have shown above how information transparency affects firms' incentives to participate in Bto-B electronic markets under quantity competition. In many real situations, firms compete on prices instead of quantities. Depending on the specific price-discovery mechanisms used by the B-to-B exchanges, price competition might be more appropriate in some situations. In this section, we extend our model to the setting of price competition and show that our methodology still holds under this alternative competition mode, though some part of the results may change.
Following a similar structure to the previous section, we first derive optimal pricing strategies * i p and * j p , for member firms and non-member firms, then compare the expected equilibrium profits of joining the B-to-B exchange versus staying offline. We present the results below, with more detailed proof provided in Appendix B.
Optimal Pricing Decisions
Assume that the demand function is still linear, but with differentiated products:
where i p , i q and d are price, quantity, and demand intercept. 
In Bertrand competition, firms choose prices based on their marginal costs and the conjectures of other firms' strategies. Basar and Ho (1974) showed that the equilibrium strategy is affine in the information set on costs. Consistent with their results, we show that 
where
where p represents the equilibrium price in the absence of cost uncertainty. Notice that y is a function of known parameters, , , , n k θ ρ , as well as unknown parameters, β . This means that members' pricing strategies also depend on their conjectures about non-members' pricing decisions. As justified earlier, a non-member' pricing strategy is expected to be a linear function of its cost. Solving the non-member firm's decision, conditional on
yields the optimal pricing strategies for non-members:
This shows that β can be computed from known parameters , , , , , n k θ ρ µ and d.
Equilibrium Profits
Having derived the optimal pricing strategies, Proposition 3 (equilibrium profits under price competition):
The equilibrium profit of member firms is expected to be:
For non-members, the equilibrium profit is expected to be:
Proof: see Appendix B.
Comparing Expected Profits: Online vs. Offline
To compare the expected profits of joining the B-to-B exchange versus staying offline, we compute the difference,
Term 1 represents the benefit of information aggregation through the B-to-B exchange. Because
This means that the B-to-B exchange would be more valuable when firms face higher uncertainty, 
Intuitively, the firms engage in strategic interactions of competition and cooperation. The combined forces of technological and stochastic interactions measure the degree of intermixture of competition and cooperation among firms. There also exists a balance of a coalition property and a zero-sum property among exchange members (Tirole 1988) . Which effect dominates depends on cost heterogeneity and product differentiation.
When products are substitutes (i.e., 0 θ > ), information exchange leads to a finer information structure about costs, which increases pricing efficiency among exchange members. Also, information exchange affects the nature of market competition, making it more "competitive" between online and offline markets yet more "collusive" among exchange members. The lowcost firms would attempt to lead and dominate the market by forming an implicit coalition among exchange members. By revealing their low, hence more competitive, costs, they credibly defer the non-members from engaging in price war with them. This would enable them to maintain higher prices than what they would charge without the B-to-B exchange. This benefits the low-cost firms.
On the other hand, when products are complements (i.e., 0 θ < ), the firms would have incentives to increase the whole "pie" of market demand. To encourage additional buyers to buy their complementary products, a firm would like to see other firms to lower prices while itself still maintains a higher price. Thus, a high-cost firm has every incentive to reveal its cost to soften other firms' pricing behavior. To understand why, suppose that firm j believes that firm i's cost is high. Then firm j believes that firm i will charge a high price, reducing the demand facing firm j.
Firm j is then led to reduce its price, which raises firm i's demand. With complement products, charging a low price is like supplying a public good; each firm claims that it will not supply the public good in order to force other firms to do so. A credible way to achieve this is to join the Bto-B exchange and prove that it has a high cost so as to force other firms to charge a lower price. Moreover, from (28), because 2
which leads to the following result:
Corollary 5 (effect of uncertainty): Higher level of uncertainty increases the participation incentives of the firms and the membership size of the exchange.
The literature shows that no firms would like to reveal cost information under price competition (Vives 1984; Gal-Or 1986 ; both are duopoly models involving two firms only). Our result is different: the incentives to make cost data transparent depend on cost heterogeneity, product differentiation, and the degree of uncertainty. In most situations, some firms trade online and some others trade offline. It is more complicated than the all-or-none situation in the literature.
Concluding Remarks
What have we learned about the informational role of B-to-B electronic marketplaces? We have found that firms' incentives to join a B-to-B exchange are sensitive to their relative cost positions, the nature of the products, the types of competition, and the degree of uncertainty. Certain types of companies (e.g., high-cost suppliers of substitute products) will lack the incentives to join the exchange as information transparency hurts more than helps them. In contrast to the widely held Given that firms' incentives are sensitive to the information structures of the B-to-B exchange, the balance between access and control of information must be carefully maintained through appropriate microstructure design of B-to-B marketplaces. The kind of data that a B-to-B exchange collects-and the conditions under which the data are made available-can make the difference between benefits and risks to participants. B-to-B exchange owners should keep an appropriate balance between information transparency and data confidentiality so as to minimize the competitive risks while safeguarding the collaborative benefits of information transparency.
Data created through transactions within a B-to-B marketplace should be guarded or strategically channeled in order to avoid the "transparency trap," though this may seem to be in direct opposition to the concept that the Internet will give birth to informationally transparent electronic markets.
On the other hand, one has to be careful when linking these results to real-world B-to-B
exchanges. There are many reasons for firms to join a B-to-B exchange (e.g., to reduce procurement costs, or to gain access to a new distribution channel). The informational effects are just one, albeit an important one, of these many factors. And even these informational effects are issue for exchange operators. Second, our simultaneous game model can be extended to a more sophisticated dynamic model with multi-periods so as to allow firms to update their belief structure after they observe the first-period equilibrium (Zhu 1999) . This is another fertile area for further research. We hope that the initial work presented in this paper will motivate other researchers to build more sophisticated models and further examine these open issues associated with the informational effects of electronic markets.
Appendix O: Proof of the Linear Conditional Expectation Property (Lemma 1)
An n-variate random vector, 
which proves Lemma 1. This result can be extended to any partition of 
In equilibrium, given the normality assumption and the linear conditional expectation property, firms' output strategies are a linear function of their costs (Basar and Ho 1974; Basar 1978) . Consistent with Shapiro (1986) , we suppose that non-member's strategies are expected to be of the form j 
where q is the equilibrium quantity in the absence of uncertainty, and
With (A5), we can now compute the aggregate quantity k Q in (A3) as follows:
12 It is trivial to show 2 2 0 q π ∂ ∂ < . The second order condition is satisfied for all remaining maximization problems.
( )
(2) Non-Member Firms: Optimal Quantities
Conditional on its information set, { } j j I c = , given that the members are expected to obey (A5) and (A8), a non-member, firm j, maximizes its profit as follows:
From firm j's viewpoint, it plays a Cournot game with its own cost j c and rivals' costs . To solve this, we use the result of (A8) to compute the conditional quantity
Similarly, we can show
Inserting (A11) and (A12) into (A10) yields
(3) Equilibrium Profits
Substituting the optimal outputs, * i q in (A5) and * j q in (A13), into the profit functions in (A1) and (A9), and using the conditional expectations (3) and (4), we can compute the equilibrium profits as follows.
For B-to-B exchange members, i K ∈ , the expected profit can be computed as: 
The second term, 2 2
( 1)[1 ( 2) ] 0 k k ψ ρ σ − + − > , represents the benefit from information aggregation facilitated by the B-to-B exchange. Taking expectations of (A5) and (A13) yields: 
Using the same approach, the expected profit for non-members, \ j N K ∈ , can be computed as: 
g
